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arm-trusted-firmware/lib/stack_protector/stack_protector.c

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Add support for GCC stack protection Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-* options. A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced. It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the protection. A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is detected. To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void the protection. FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a timer's value, which could be predictable. Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
8 years ago
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
Use SPDX license identifiers To make software license auditing simpler, use SPDX[0] license identifiers instead of duplicating the license text in every file. NOTE: Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified. [0]: https://spdx.org/ Change-Id: I80a00e1f641b8cc075ca5a95b10607ed9ed8761a Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
8 years ago
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
Add support for GCC stack protection Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-* options. A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced. It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the protection. A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is detected. To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void the protection. FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a timer's value, which could be predictable. Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
8 years ago
*/
Sanitise includes across codebase Enforce full include path for includes. Deprecate old paths. The following folders inside include/lib have been left unchanged: - include/lib/cpus/${ARCH} - include/lib/el3_runtime/${ARCH} The reason for this change is that having a global namespace for includes isn't a good idea. It defeats one of the advantages of having folders and it introduces problems that are sometimes subtle (because you may not know the header you are actually including if there are two of them). For example, this patch had to be created because two headers were called the same way: e0ea0928d5b7 ("Fix gpio includes of mt8173 platform to avoid collision."). More recently, this patch has had similar problems: 46f9b2c3a282 ("drivers: add tzc380 support"). This problem was introduced in commit 4ecca33988b9 ("Move include and source files to logical locations"). At that time, there weren't too many headers so it wasn't a real issue. However, time has shown that this creates problems. Platforms that want to preserve the way they include headers may add the removed paths to PLAT_INCLUDES, but this is discouraged. Change-Id: I39dc53ed98f9e297a5966e723d1936d6ccf2fc8f Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
6 years ago
Add support for GCC stack protection Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-* options. A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced. It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the protection. A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is detected. To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void the protection. FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a timer's value, which could be predictable. Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
8 years ago
#include <stdint.h>
Sanitise includes across codebase Enforce full include path for includes. Deprecate old paths. The following folders inside include/lib have been left unchanged: - include/lib/cpus/${ARCH} - include/lib/el3_runtime/${ARCH} The reason for this change is that having a global namespace for includes isn&#39;t a good idea. It defeats one of the advantages of having folders and it introduces problems that are sometimes subtle (because you may not know the header you are actually including if there are two of them). For example, this patch had to be created because two headers were called the same way: e0ea0928d5b7 (&#34;Fix gpio includes of mt8173 platform to avoid collision.&#34;). More recently, this patch has had similar problems: 46f9b2c3a282 (&#34;drivers: add tzc380 support&#34;). This problem was introduced in commit 4ecca33988b9 (&#34;Move include and source files to logical locations&#34;). At that time, there weren&#39;t too many headers so it wasn&#39;t a real issue. However, time has shown that this creates problems. Platforms that want to preserve the way they include headers may add the removed paths to PLAT_INCLUDES, but this is discouraged. Change-Id: I39dc53ed98f9e297a5966e723d1936d6ccf2fc8f Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz &lt;antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com&gt;
6 years ago
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <plat/common/platform.h>
Add support for GCC stack protection Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-* options. A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced. It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the protection. A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is detected. To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void the protection. FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a timer&#39;s value, which could be predictable. Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard &lt;douglas.raillard@arm.com&gt;
8 years ago
/*
* Canary value used by the compiler runtime checks to detect stack corruption.
*
* Force the canary to be in .data to allow predictable memory layout relatively
* to the stacks.
*/
u_register_t __attribute__((section(".data.stack_protector_canary")))
__stack_chk_guard = (u_register_t) 3288484550995823360ULL;
/*
* Function called when the stack's canary check fails, which means the stack
* was corrupted. It must not return.
*/
void __dead2 __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
#if DEBUG
ERROR("Stack corruption detected\n");
#endif
panic();
}