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Merge "Add support for Branch Target Identification" into integration

pull/1930/head
Paul Beesley 6 years ago
committed by TrustedFirmware Code Review
parent
commit
508a48bb32
  1. 56
      Makefile
  2. 4
      bl1/bl1.mk
  3. 8
      bl2/aarch64/bl2_el3_entrypoint.S
  4. 7
      bl2/aarch64/bl2_entrypoint.S
  5. 4
      bl2/bl2.mk
  6. 14
      bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S
  7. 4
      bl31/bl31.mk
  8. 10
      bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S
  9. 5
      bl32/tsp/tsp.mk
  10. 8
      docs/design/firmware-design.rst
  11. 52
      docs/getting_started/user-guide.rst
  12. 12
      include/arch/aarch64/arch.h
  13. 6
      include/arch/aarch64/arch_features.h
  14. 28
      include/arch/aarch64/asm_macros.S
  15. 8
      include/common/asm_macros_common.S
  16. 7
      include/lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h
  17. 8
      lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S
  18. 46
      lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu_helpers.S
  19. 244
      lib/extensions/amu/aarch64/amu_helpers.S
  20. 15
      lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c
  21. 9
      lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c
  22. 12
      make_helpers/defaults.mk

56
Makefile

@ -117,6 +117,29 @@ ifneq (${GENERATE_COT},0)
FWU_FIP_DEPS += fwu_certificates
endif
# Process BRANCH_PROTECTION value and set
# Pointer Authentication and Branch Target Identification flags
ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},0)
# Default value turns off all types of branch protection
BP_OPTION := none
else ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
$(error BRANCH_PROTECTION requires AArch64)
else ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},1)
# Enables all types of branch protection features
BP_OPTION := standard
ENABLE_BTI := 1
ENABLE_PAUTH := 1
else ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},2)
# Return address signing to its standard level
BP_OPTION := pac-ret
ENABLE_PAUTH := 1
else ifeq (${BRANCH_PROTECTION},3)
# Extend the signing to include leaf functions
BP_OPTION := pac-ret+leaf
ENABLE_PAUTH := 1
else
$(error Unknown BRANCH_PROTECTION value ${BRANCH_PROTECTION})
endif
################################################################################
# Toolchain
@ -189,6 +212,10 @@ endif
TF_CFLAGS_aarch32 += -mno-unaligned-access
TF_CFLAGS_aarch64 += -mgeneral-regs-only -mstrict-align
ifneq (${BP_OPTION},none)
TF_CFLAGS_aarch64 += -mbranch-protection=${BP_OPTION}
endif
ASFLAGS_aarch32 = $(march32-directive)
ASFLAGS_aarch64 = $(march64-directive)
@ -451,24 +478,28 @@ ifeq ($(DYN_DISABLE_AUTH), 1)
endif
# If pointer authentication is used in the firmware, make sure that all the
# registers associated to it are also saved and restored. Not doing it would
# leak the value of the key used by EL3 to EL1 and S-EL1.
# registers associated to it are also saved and restored.
# Not doing it would leak the value of the keys used by EL3 to EL1 and S-EL1.
ifeq ($(ENABLE_PAUTH),1)
ifneq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
$(error ENABLE_PAUTH=1 requires AArch64)
else ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),0)
$(error ENABLE_PAUTH=1 requires CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1)
else
$(info ENABLE_PAUTH and CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS are experimental features)
ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),0)
$(error Pointer Authentication requires CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1)
endif
else
endif
ifeq ($(CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS),1)
ifneq ($(ARCH),aarch64)
$(error CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1 requires AArch64)
ifneq (${ARCH},aarch64)
$(error CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS requires AArch64)
else
$(info CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS is an experimental feature)
endif
endif
ifeq ($(ENABLE_PAUTH),1)
$(info Pointer Authentication is an experimental feature)
endif
ifeq ($(ENABLE_BTI),1)
$(info Branch Protection is an experimental feature)
endif
################################################################################
@ -599,7 +630,6 @@ $(eval $(call assert_boolean,EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_AMU))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_ASSERTIONS))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_MPAM_FOR_LOWER_ELS))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PAUTH))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PIE))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PMF))
$(eval $(call assert_boolean,ENABLE_PSCI_STAT))
@ -635,6 +665,7 @@ $(eval $(call assert_boolean,BL2_IN_XIP_MEM))
$(eval $(call assert_numeric,ARM_ARCH_MAJOR))
$(eval $(call assert_numeric,ARM_ARCH_MINOR))
$(eval $(call assert_numeric,BRANCH_PROTECTION))
################################################################################
# Add definitions to the cpp preprocessor based on the current build options.
@ -651,6 +682,7 @@ $(eval $(call add_define,CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS))
$(eval $(call add_define,EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_AMU))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_ASSERTIONS))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_BTI))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_MPAM_FOR_LOWER_ELS))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_PAUTH))
$(eval $(call add_define,ENABLE_PIE))

4
bl1/bl1.mk

@ -21,10 +21,6 @@ BL1_SOURCES += lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S \
lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S
endif
ifeq (${ENABLE_PAUTH},1)
BL1_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
endif
ifeq (${TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT},1)
BL1_SOURCES += bl1/bl1_fwu.c
endif

8
bl2/aarch64/bl2_el3_entrypoint.S

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
#include <el3_common_macros.S>
.globl bl2_entrypoint
.globl bl2_vector_table
.globl bl2_el3_run_image
.globl bl2_run_next_image
@ -51,6 +50,13 @@ func bl2_entrypoint
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Enable PAC branch type compatibility
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_BT_BIT
#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */

7
bl2/aarch64/bl2_entrypoint.S

@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ func bl2_entrypoint
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el1
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Enable PAC branch type compatibility
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bic x0, x0, #(SCTLR_BT0_BIT | SCTLR_BT1_BIT)
#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el1, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */

4
bl2/bl2.mk

@ -15,10 +15,6 @@ ifeq (${ARCH},aarch64)
BL2_SOURCES += common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S
endif
ifeq (${ENABLE_PAUTH},1)
BL2_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
endif
ifeq (${BL2_AT_EL3},0)
BL2_SOURCES += bl2/${ARCH}/bl2_entrypoint.S
BL2_LINKERFILE := bl2/bl2.ld.S

14
bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S

@ -105,6 +105,13 @@ func bl31_entrypoint
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* --------------------------------------------------------------------
* Enable PAC branch type compatibility
* --------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_BT_BIT
#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
@ -211,6 +218,13 @@ func bl31_warm_entrypoint
mrs x0, sctlr_el3
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* --------------------------------------------------------------------
* Enable PAC branch type compatibility
* --------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
bic x0, x0, #SCTLR_BT_BIT
#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el3, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */

4
bl31/bl31.mk

@ -75,10 +75,6 @@ ifeq (${ENABLE_MPAM_FOR_LOWER_ELS},1)
BL31_SOURCES += lib/extensions/mpam/mpam.c
endif
ifeq (${ENABLE_PAUTH},1)
BL31_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
endif
ifeq (${WORKAROUND_CVE_2017_5715},1)
BL31_SOURCES += lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S \
lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_mmu.S

10
bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_entrypoint.S

@ -136,6 +136,13 @@ func tsp_entrypoint _align=3
#if ENABLE_PAUTH
mrs x0, sctlr_el1
orr x0, x0, #SCTLR_EnIA_BIT
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* ---------------------------------------------
* Enable PAC branch type compatibility
* ---------------------------------------------
*/
bic x0, x0, #(SCTLR_BT0_BIT | SCTLR_BT1_BIT)
#endif /* ENABLE_BTI */
msr sctlr_el1, x0
isb
#endif /* ENABLE_PAUTH */
@ -164,7 +171,7 @@ endfunc tsp_entrypoint
* TSPD for the various entrypoints
* -------------------------------------------
*/
func tsp_vector_table
vector_base tsp_vector_table
b tsp_yield_smc_entry
b tsp_fast_smc_entry
b tsp_cpu_on_entry
@ -175,7 +182,6 @@ func tsp_vector_table
b tsp_system_off_entry
b tsp_system_reset_entry
b tsp_abort_yield_smc_entry
endfunc tsp_vector_table
/*---------------------------------------------
* This entrypoint is used by the TSPD when this

5
bl32/tsp/tsp.mk

@ -17,11 +17,6 @@ BL32_SOURCES += bl32/tsp/tsp_main.c \
BL32_LINKERFILE := bl32/tsp/tsp.ld.S
# This flag determines whether pointer authentication is used in the TSP or not
ifeq ($(ENABLE_PAUTH),1)
BL32_CFLAGS += -msign-return-address=non-leaf
endif
# This flag determines if the TSPD initializes BL32 in tspd_init() (synchronous
# method) or configures BL31 to pass control to BL32 instead of BL33
# (asynchronous method).

8
docs/design/firmware-design.rst

@ -2564,7 +2564,7 @@ Armv8.3-A
to the context that is saved when doing a world switch.
The TF-A itself has support for pointer authentication at runtime
that can be enabled by setting both options ``ENABLE_PAUTH`` and
that can be enabled by setting ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` option to non-zero and
``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS`` to 1. This enables pointer authentication in BL1,
BL2, BL31, and the TSP if it is used.
@ -2577,6 +2577,12 @@ Armv8.3-A
enabling PAuth is lower because the compiler will use the optimized
PAuth instructions rather than the backwards-compatible ones.
Armv8.5-A
~~~~~~~~~
- Branch Target Identification feature is selected by ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``
option set to 1. This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
Armv7-A
~~~~~~~

52
docs/getting_started/user-guide.rst

@ -315,6 +315,34 @@ Common build options
file that contains the BL33 private key in PEM format. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``,
this file name will be used to save the key.
- ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication
and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves.
If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option
``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use:
- 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection
- 1: Enables all types of branch protection features
- 2: Return address signing to its standard level
- 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions
The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options
and resulting PAuth/BTI features.
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI |
+=======+==============+=======+=====+
| 0 | none | N | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 1 | standard | Y | Y |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 2 | pac-ret | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world
irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it.
- ``BUILD_MESSAGE_TIMESTAMP``: String used to identify the time and date of the
compilation of each build. It must be set to a C string (including quotes
where applicable). Defaults to a string that contains the time and date of
@ -354,17 +382,12 @@ Common build options
registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context. Default
is 0.
- ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS``: Boolean option that, when set to 1, allows
Pointer Authentication for **Secure world**. This will cause the
Armv8.3-PAuth registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU
context as part of a world switch. Default value is 0. Pointer Authentication
is an experimental feature.
Note that, if the CPU supports it, Pointer Authentication is allowed for
Non-secure world irrespectively of the value of this flag. "Allowed" means
that accesses to PAuth-related registers or execution of PAuth-related
instructions will not be trapped to EL3. As such, usage or not of PAuth in
Non-secure world images, depends on those images themselves.
- ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS``: Boolean option that, when set to 1, enables
Pointer Authentication for Secure world. This will cause the ARMv8.3-PAuth
registers to be included when saving and restoring the CPU context as
part of world switch. Default value is 0 and this is an experimental feature.
Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world irrespective
of the value of this flag if the CPU supports it.
- ``DEBUG``: Chooses between a debug and release build. It can take either 0
(release) or 1 (debug) as values. 0 is the default.
@ -417,13 +440,6 @@ Common build options
partitioning in EL3, however. Platform initialisation code should configure
and use partitions in EL3 as required. This option defaults to ``0``.
- ``ENABLE_PAUTH``: Boolean option to enable Armv8.3 Pointer Authentication
for **TF-A BL images themselves**. If enabled, the compiler must support the
``-msign-return-address`` option. This flag defaults to 0. Pointer
Authentication is an experimental feature.
If this flag is enabled, ``CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS`` must also be enabled.
- ``ENABLE_PIE``: Boolean option to enable Position Independent Executable(PIE)
support within generic code in TF-A. This option is currently only supported
in BL31. Default is 0.

12
include/arch/aarch64/arch.h

@ -163,16 +163,12 @@
/* ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 definitions */
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 S3_0_C0_C6_1
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT U(28)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT U(24)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT U(8)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_WIDTH U(4)
#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_MASK ULL(0xf)
/* ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 definitions */
@ -217,6 +213,11 @@
#define SSBS_UNAVAILABLE ULL(0) /* No architectural SSBS support */
#define ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_SHIFT U(0)
#define ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_MASK ULL(0xf)
#define BTI_IMPLEMENTED ULL(1) /* The BTI mechanism is implemented */
/* ID_PFR1_EL1 definitions */
#define ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_SHIFT U(12)
#define ID_PFR1_VIRTEXT_MASK U(0xf)
@ -260,6 +261,9 @@
#define SCTLR_EE_BIT (ULL(1) << 25)
#define SCTLR_UCI_BIT (ULL(1) << 26)
#define SCTLR_EnIA_BIT (ULL(1) << 31)
#define SCTLR_BT0_BIT (ULL(1) << 35)
#define SCTLR_BT1_BIT (ULL(1) << 36)
#define SCTLR_BT_BIT (ULL(1) << 36)
#define SCTLR_DSSBS_BIT (ULL(1) << 44)
#define SCTLR_RESET_VAL SCTLR_EL3_RES1

6
include/arch/aarch64/arch_features.h

@ -48,4 +48,10 @@ static inline bool is_armv8_4_ttst_present(void)
ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_ST_MASK) == 1U;
}
static inline bool is_armv8_5_bti_present(void)
{
return ((read_id_aa64pfr1_el1() >> ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_SHIFT) &
ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_BT_MASK) == BTI_IMPLEMENTED;
}
#endif /* ARCH_FEATURES_H */

28
include/arch/aarch64/asm_macros.S

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
#include <common/asm_macros_common.S>
#include <lib/spinlock.h>
#if ENABLE_BTI && !ARM_ARCH_AT_LEAST(8, 5)
#error Branch Target Identification requires ARM_ARCH_MINOR >= 5
#endif
/*
* TLBI instruction with type specifier that implements the workaround for
* errata 813419 of Cortex-A57 or errata 1286807 of Cortex-A76.
@ -192,4 +196,26 @@
.endm
#endif
/*
* Helper macro to read system register value into x0
*/
.macro read reg:req
#if ENABLE_BTI
bti j
#endif
mrs x0, \reg
ret
.endm
/*
* Helper macro to write value from x1 to system register
*/
.macro write reg:req
#if ENABLE_BTI
bti j
#endif
msr \reg, x1
ret
.endm
#endif /* ASM_MACROS_S */

8
include/common/asm_macros_common.S

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
.cfi_startproc
.align \_align
\_name:
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* When Branch Target Identification is enabled, insert "bti jc"
* instruction to enable indirect calls and branches
*/
bti jc
#endif
.endm
/*

7
include/lib/xlat_tables/xlat_tables_defs.h

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -62,6 +62,11 @@
#define OSH (U(0x2) << 6)
#define ISH (U(0x3) << 6)
#ifdef AARCH64
/* Guarded Page bit */
#define GP (ULL(1) << 50)
#endif
#define TABLE_ADDR_MASK ULL(0x0000FFFFFFFFF000)
/*

8
lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2013-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ func do_dcsw_op
cbz x3, exit
adr x14, dcsw_loop_table // compute inner loop address
add x14, x14, x0, lsl #5 // inner loop is 8x32-bit instructions
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x14, x14, x0, lsl #2 // inner loop is + "bti j" instruction
#endif
mov x0, x9
mov w8, #1
loop1:
@ -116,6 +119,9 @@ loop1:
br x14 // jump to DC operation specific loop
.macro dcsw_loop _op
#if ENABLE_BTI
bti j
#endif
loop2_\_op:
lsl w7, w6, w2 // w7 = aligned max set number

46
lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu_helpers.S

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2018-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -23,21 +23,17 @@
*/
func cpuamu_cnt_read
adr x1, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3
add x1, x1, x0
add x1, x1, x0, lsl #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x1, x1, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x1
1:
mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0
ret
mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0
ret
mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0
ret
mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0
ret
mrs x0, CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0
ret
1: read CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0
read CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0
read CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0
read CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0
read CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0
endfunc cpuamu_cnt_read
/*
@ -47,21 +43,17 @@ endfunc cpuamu_cnt_read
*/
func cpuamu_cnt_write
adr x2, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3
add x2, x2, x0
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x2
1:
msr CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0, x0
ret
msr CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0, x0
ret
msr CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0, x0
ret
msr CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0, x0
ret
msr CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0, x0
ret
1: write CPUAMEVCNTR0_EL0
write CPUAMEVCNTR1_EL0
write CPUAMEVCNTR2_EL0
write CPUAMEVCNTR3_EL0
write CPUAMEVCNTR4_EL0
endfunc cpuamu_cnt_write
/*

244
lib/extensions/amu/aarch64/amu_helpers.S

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -21,35 +21,29 @@
* and return it in `x0`.
*/
func amu_group0_cnt_read_internal
adr x1, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
mov x1, x0
lsr x1, x1, #2
cmp x1, #0
tst x0, #~3
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
adr x1, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
add x1, x1, x0
add x1, x1, x0, lsl #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x1, x1, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x1
1:
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR00_EL0 /* index 0 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR01_EL0 /* index 1 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR02_EL0 /* index 2 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR03_EL0 /* index 3 */
ret
1: read AMEVCNTR00_EL0 /* index 0 */
read AMEVCNTR01_EL0 /* index 1 */
read AMEVCNTR02_EL0 /* index 2 */
read AMEVCNTR03_EL0 /* index 3 */
endfunc amu_group0_cnt_read_internal
/*
@ -58,35 +52,29 @@ endfunc amu_group0_cnt_read_internal
* Given `idx`, write `val` to the corresponding AMU counter.
*/
func amu_group0_cnt_write_internal
adr x2, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
mov x2, x0
lsr x2, x2, #2
cmp x2, #0
tst x0, #~3
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
adr x2, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
add x2, x2, x0
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x2
1:
msr AMEVCNTR00_EL0, x1 /* index 0 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR01_EL0, x1 /* index 1 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR02_EL0, x1 /* index 2 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR03_EL0, x1 /* index 3 */
ret
1: write AMEVCNTR00_EL0 /* index 0 */
write AMEVCNTR01_EL0 /* index 1 */
write AMEVCNTR02_EL0 /* index 2 */
write AMEVCNTR03_EL0 /* index 3 */
endfunc amu_group0_cnt_write_internal
/*
@ -96,59 +84,41 @@ endfunc amu_group0_cnt_write_internal
* and return it in `x0`.
*/
func amu_group1_cnt_read_internal
adr x1, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
mov x1, x0
lsr x1, x1, #4
cmp x1, #0
tst x0, #~0xF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
adr x1, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
add x1, x1, x0
add x1, x1, x0, lsl #3 /* each mrs/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x1, x1, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x1
1:
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR10_EL0 /* index 0 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR11_EL0 /* index 1 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR12_EL0 /* index 2 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR13_EL0 /* index 3 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR14_EL0 /* index 4 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR15_EL0 /* index 5 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR16_EL0 /* index 6 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR17_EL0 /* index 7 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR18_EL0 /* index 8 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR19_EL0 /* index 9 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
ret
mrs x0, AMEVCNTR1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
ret
1: read AMEVCNTR10_EL0 /* index 0 */
read AMEVCNTR11_EL0 /* index 1 */
read AMEVCNTR12_EL0 /* index 2 */
read AMEVCNTR13_EL0 /* index 3 */
read AMEVCNTR14_EL0 /* index 4 */
read AMEVCNTR15_EL0 /* index 5 */
read AMEVCNTR16_EL0 /* index 6 */
read AMEVCNTR17_EL0 /* index 7 */
read AMEVCNTR18_EL0 /* index 8 */
read AMEVCNTR19_EL0 /* index 9 */
read AMEVCNTR1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
read AMEVCNTR1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
read AMEVCNTR1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
read AMEVCNTR1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
read AMEVCNTR1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
read AMEVCNTR1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
endfunc amu_group1_cnt_read_internal
/*
@ -157,59 +127,41 @@ endfunc amu_group1_cnt_read_internal
* Given `idx`, write `val` to the corresponding AMU counter.
*/
func amu_group1_cnt_write_internal
adr x2, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
mov x2, x0
lsr x2, x2, #4
cmp x2, #0
tst x0, #~0xF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of mrs/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
adr x2, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
add x2, x2, x0
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x2
1:
msr AMEVCNTR10_EL0, x1 /* index 0 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR11_EL0, x1 /* index 1 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR12_EL0, x1 /* index 2 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR13_EL0, x1 /* index 3 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR14_EL0, x1 /* index 4 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR15_EL0, x1 /* index 5 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR16_EL0, x1 /* index 6 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR17_EL0, x1 /* index 7 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR18_EL0, x1 /* index 8 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR19_EL0, x1 /* index 9 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR1A_EL0, x1 /* index 10 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR1B_EL0, x1 /* index 11 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR1C_EL0, x1 /* index 12 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR1D_EL0, x1 /* index 13 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR1E_EL0, x1 /* index 14 */
ret
msr AMEVCNTR1F_EL0, x1 /* index 15 */
ret
1: write AMEVCNTR10_EL0 /* index 0 */
write AMEVCNTR11_EL0 /* index 1 */
write AMEVCNTR12_EL0 /* index 2 */
write AMEVCNTR13_EL0 /* index 3 */
write AMEVCNTR14_EL0 /* index 4 */
write AMEVCNTR15_EL0 /* index 5 */
write AMEVCNTR16_EL0 /* index 6 */
write AMEVCNTR17_EL0 /* index 7 */
write AMEVCNTR18_EL0 /* index 8 */
write AMEVCNTR19_EL0 /* index 9 */
write AMEVCNTR1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
write AMEVCNTR1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
write AMEVCNTR1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
write AMEVCNTR1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
write AMEVCNTR1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
write AMEVCNTR1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
endfunc amu_group1_cnt_write_internal
/*
@ -219,63 +171,43 @@ endfunc amu_group1_cnt_write_internal
* with the value `val`.
*/
func amu_group1_set_evtype_internal
adr x2, 1f
#if ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
/*
* It can be dangerous to call this function with an
* out of bounds index. Ensure `idx` is valid.
*/
mov x2, x0
lsr x2, x2, #4
cmp x2, #0
tst x0, #~0xF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
/* val should be between [0, 65535] */
mov x2, x1
lsr x2, x2, #16
cmp x2, #0
tst x1, #~0xFFFF
ASM_ASSERT(eq)
#endif
/*
* Given `idx` calculate address of msr/ret instruction pair
* in the table below.
*/
adr x2, 1f
lsl x0, x0, #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
add x2, x2, x0
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #3 /* each msr/ret sequence is 8 bytes */
#if ENABLE_BTI
add x2, x2, x0, lsl #2 /* + "bti j" instruction */
#endif
br x2
1:
msr AMEVTYPER10_EL0, x1 /* index 0 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER11_EL0, x1 /* index 1 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER12_EL0, x1 /* index 2 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER13_EL0, x1 /* index 3 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER14_EL0, x1 /* index 4 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER15_EL0, x1 /* index 5 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER16_EL0, x1 /* index 6 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER17_EL0, x1 /* index 7 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER18_EL0, x1 /* index 8 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER19_EL0, x1 /* index 9 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER1A_EL0, x1 /* index 10 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER1B_EL0, x1 /* index 11 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER1C_EL0, x1 /* index 12 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER1D_EL0, x1 /* index 13 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER1E_EL0, x1 /* index 14 */
ret
msr AMEVTYPER1F_EL0, x1 /* index 15 */
ret
1: write AMEVTYPER10_EL0 /* index 0 */
write AMEVTYPER11_EL0 /* index 1 */
write AMEVTYPER12_EL0 /* index 2 */
write AMEVTYPER13_EL0 /* index 3 */
write AMEVTYPER14_EL0 /* index 4 */
write AMEVTYPER15_EL0 /* index 5 */
write AMEVTYPER16_EL0 /* index 6 */
write AMEVTYPER17_EL0 /* index 7 */
write AMEVTYPER18_EL0 /* index 8 */
write AMEVTYPER19_EL0 /* index 9 */
write AMEVTYPER1A_EL0 /* index 10 */
write AMEVTYPER1B_EL0 /* index 11 */
write AMEVTYPER1C_EL0 /* index 12 */
write AMEVTYPER1D_EL0 /* index 13 */
write AMEVTYPER1E_EL0 /* index 14 */
write AMEVTYPER1F_EL0 /* index 15 */
endfunc amu_group1_set_evtype_internal

15
lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <platform_def.h>
#include <arch_features.h>
#include <arch_helpers.h>
#include <common/debug.h>
#include <lib/utils_def.h>
@ -195,6 +196,18 @@ uint64_t xlat_desc(const xlat_ctx_t *ctx, uint32_t attr,
if (mem_type == MT_MEMORY) {
desc |= LOWER_ATTRS(ATTR_IWBWA_OWBWA_NTR_INDEX | ISH);
/* Check if Branch Target Identification is enabled */
#if ENABLE_BTI
/* Set GP bit for block and page code entries
* if BTI mechanism is implemented.
*/
if (is_armv8_5_bti_present() &&
((attr & (MT_TYPE_MASK | MT_RW |
MT_EXECUTE_NEVER)) == MT_CODE)) {
desc |= GP;
}
#endif
} else {
assert(mem_type == MT_NON_CACHEABLE);
desc |= LOWER_ATTRS(ATTR_NON_CACHEABLE_INDEX | OSH);

9
lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2017-2019, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
@ -96,6 +96,13 @@ static void xlat_desc_print(const xlat_ctx_t *ctx, uint64_t desc)
}
printf(((LOWER_ATTRS(NS) & desc) != 0ULL) ? "-NS" : "-S");
#ifdef AARCH64
/* Check Guarded Page bit */
if ((desc & GP) != 0ULL) {
printf("-GP");
}
#endif
}
static const char * const level_spacers[] = {

12
make_helpers/defaults.mk

@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ BL2_AT_EL3 := 0
# when BL2_AT_EL3 is 1.
BL2_IN_XIP_MEM := 0
# Select the branch protection features to use.
BRANCH_PROTECTION := 0
# By default, consider that the platform may release several CPUs out of reset.
# The platform Makefile is free to override this value.
COLD_BOOT_SINGLE_CPU := 0
@ -90,7 +93,14 @@ ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR := 0
# Flag to enable exception handling in EL3
EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING := 0
# Flag to enable Pointer Authentication
# Flag to enable Branch Target Identification.
# Internal flag not meant for direct setting.
# Use BRANCH_PROTECTION to enable BTI.
ENABLE_BTI := 0
# Flag to enable Pointer Authentication.
# Internal flag not meant for direct setting.
# Use BRANCH_PROTECTION to enable PAUTH.
ENABLE_PAUTH := 0
# Build flag to treat usage of deprecated platform and framework APIs as error.

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