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Merge "docs(threat_model): cover the 'timing' side channel threat" into integration

pull/2000/merge
Madhukar Pappireddy 8 months ago
committed by TrustedFirmware Code Review
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  1. 56
      docs/threat_model/firmware_threat_model/threat_model.rst

56
docs/threat_model/firmware_threat_model/threat_model.rst
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@ -623,6 +623,62 @@ General Threats for All Firmware Images
| | UART interface(s). |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| ID | 16 |
+========================+=====================================================+
| Threat | | **An attacker could analyse the timing behaviour |
| | of implemented methods in the system to infer |
| | sensitive information.** |
| | |
| | | A timing side-channel attack is a type of attack |
| | that exploits variations in the time it takes a |
| | system to perform different operations. This |
| | form of attack focuses on analyzing the time- |
| | related information leakage that occurs during |
| | the execution of cryptographic algorithms or |
| | other security-sensitive processes. By observing |
| | these timing differences, an attacker can gain |
| | insights into the internal workings of a system |
| | and potentially extract sensitive information. |
| | Sensitive information that, when revealed even |
| | partially, could heighten the susceptibility to |
| | traditional attacks like brute-force attacks. |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Diagram Elements | DF2 |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Affected TF-A | BL1, BL2, BL31 |
| Components | |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Assets | Sensitive Data |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Threat Agent | AppDebug |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Threat Type | Information Disclosure |
+------------------------+------------------+----------------+-----------------+
| Application | Server | IoT | Mobile |
+------------------------+------------------+----------------+-----------------+
| Impact | Critical (5) | Critical (5) | Critical (5) |
+------------------------+------------------+----------------+-----------------+
| Likelihood | Critical (5) | Critical (5) | Critical (5) |
+------------------------+------------------+----------------+-----------------+
| Total Risk Rating | Critical (25) | Critical (25) | Critical (25) |
+------------------------+------------------+----------------+-----------------+
| Mitigations | | Ensure that the execution time of critical |
| | operations is constant and independent of |
| | secret data. This prevents attackers from |
| | exploiting timing differences to infer |
| | information about sensitive data. |
| | |
| | | Introduce random delays/timing jitter or dummy |
| | operations to make the timing behavior of program|
| | execution less predictable. This can disrupt the |
| | correlation between the execution time and |
| | sensitive data. |
| | |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
| Mitigations | | Not implemented |
| implemented? | |
+------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------+
.. _Boot Firmware Threats:

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