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We can't meaningfully audit the other WebAssembly implementations that we use for differential fuzzing, such as wasmi and especially v8. Let's acknowledge that the effort to do so is not practical for us, and focus our vetting efforts on crates that developers and users are more likely to build. This reduces our estimated audit backlog by over three million lines, according to `cargo vet suggest`. Note that our crates which depend on those engines, such as wasmtime-fuzzing, are not published to crates.io, so if we fall victim to a supply chain attack against dependencies of these crates, the folks who might be impacted are limited. Although there is value in also auditing code that might be run by people who clone our git repository, in this case I propose that anyone who is concerned about the risks of supply chain attacks against their development systems should be running fuzzers inside a sandbox. After all, it's a fuzzer: it's specifically designed to try to do anything.pull/8532/head
Jamey Sharp
6 months ago
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2 changed files with 32 additions and 4 deletions
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