* cranelift-wasm: Add a bounds-checking optimization for dynamic memories and guard pages
This is a new special case for when we know that there are enough guard pages to
cover the memory access's offset and access size.
The precise should-we-trap condition is
index + offset + access_size > bound
However, if we instead check only the partial condition
index > bound
then the most out of bounds that the access can be, while that partial check
still succeeds, is `offset + access_size`.
However, when we have a guard region that is at least as large as `offset +
access_size`, we can rely on the virtual memory subsystem handling these
out-of-bounds errors at runtime. Therefore, the partial `index > bound` check is
sufficient for this heap configuration.
Additionally, this has the advantage that a series of Wasm loads that use the
same dynamic index operand but different static offset immediates -- which is a
common code pattern when accessing multiple fields in the same struct that is in
linear memory -- will all emit the same `index > bound` check, which we can GVN.
* cranelift: Add WAT tests for accessing dynamic memories with the same index but different offsets
The bounds check comparison is GVN'd but we still branch on values we should
know will always be true if we get this far in the code. This is actual `br_if`s
in the non-Spectre code and `select_spectre_guard`s that we should know will
always go a certain way if we have Spectre mitigations enabled.
Improving the non-Spectre case is pretty straightforward: walk the dominator
tree and remember which values we've already branched on at this point, and
therefore we can simplify any further conditional branches on those same values
into direct jumps.
Improving the Spectre case requires something that is morally the same, but has
a few snags:
* We don't have actual `br_if`s to determine whether the bounds checking
condition succeeded or not. We need to instead reason about dominating
`select_spectre_guard; {load, store}` instruction pairs.
* We have to be SUPER careful about reasoning "through" `select_spectre_guard`s.
Our general rule is never to do that, since it could break the speculative
execution sandboxing that the instruction is designed for.
Nick Fitzgerald
2e48babf23